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SME growth trajectories, transitions and board role portfolios: a critical review 
and integrative model 
 
Abstract 
This article presents a novel framework integrating a dynamic states approach to firm 
growth and a portfolio perspective of board roles. In our framework we highlight four 
typical firm growth states aligned with primary board roles to guide firms effectively 
through the transitions associated with each state to reach a new equilibrium. The 
particular contribution of our framework is that it takes SME heterogeneity into account, 
while capturing the dynamic nature of these states which are reached along non-linear, 
non-sequential and non-deterministic transitional pathways, as well as incorporating 
reverse and counterintuitive trajectories between states. 
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Introduction 
A large and growing literature relates to the governance of small and medium firms 
(SMEs), with extensive debate over the value and contribution of boards of directors and 
their roles in this context (Boxer et al., 2016; Gnan et al., 2015; Wilson et al., 2014). Much 
of this debate considers board value from a static perspective. However, the question of 
board value and contribution is more complex when considered in circumstances of 
dynamic change. Recent studies have attempted to address this question by researching 
board roles in conjunction with small firm growth paths and the changes experienced over 
the course of their existence (Bonn and Pettigrew, 2009; Filatotchev et al., 2006; Perrault 
and McHugh, 2015). 
Two key issues arise from this debate. The first issue relates to an almost exclusive use of 
life cycle models to match board roles with SME growth patterns (Bonn and Pettigrew, 
2009; Lynall et al., 2003) and transitions accompanying growth (Filatotchev et al., 2006; 
Perrault and McHugh, 2015). The focus on growth and life cycles implies unidirectional, 
deterministic patterns of development and ignores the complex realities that most firms 
encounter, such as erratic growth, turnaround situations and reversals due to decline or 
other negative impacts (Perrault and McHugh, 2015). The second issue concerns the 
highly heterogeneous and dynamic nature of SMEs (Delmar et al., 2003; Empson, 2010; 
Phelps et al., 2007), making it difficult to encapsulate theoretically their governance needs 
in a comprehensive model. 
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These issues indicate the need for a broader conceptualisation that reflects more 
adequately the complexities associated with small firm heterogeneity and dynamics, in 
addressing the question of how SME boards can add strategic value. The novel framework 
we develop in this paper provides a more complete specification of both board and firm 
characteristics associated with transitional dynamics through growth and transformation. 
While recognizing the overlap of board roles, as well as the need for boards to perform 
more than a single role, our model highlights the most valuable board role for each 
transition we depict. To ground our framework, we review and build on two streams of 
literature relating to board roles in smaller firms, and SME growth and development 
models. 
Numerous firm life cycle models exist (Greiner, 1972; Phelps et al., 2007; Quinn and 
Cameron, 1983). Among these, stages models continue to attract strong research interest 
despite substantial criticism in the firm growth and life cycle literature (Becker et al., 2015; 
Delmar and Wiklund, 2008; Levie and Lichtenstein, 2010). Researchers have endeavoured 
to overcome the criticisms of life cycle models with terminology that avoids misleading 
biological connotations implied by the stages metaphor, a linear deterministic view, and a 
focus solely on growth. Patterns of change and firm evolution have been better expressed 
as “dynamic states” than as “stages of growth” (Levie and Lichtenstein, 2010). 
Furthermore, an understanding of the dynamics which trigger transitions between states 
adds greater relevance to models of firm evolution (Brown and Mawson, 2013). However, 
4 
 
these dynamic states have not been encapsulated in a single model because of small firm 
heterogeneity. 
SMEs differ from large firms and also from each other (Daily and Dalton, 1993; Huse, 
2000; Lynall et al., 2003). While for SMEs solid analytical dimensions are necessary for 
building a comprehensive model that embodies their heterogeneous nature, problems of 
definition and measurement continue to challenge researchers (Bouckenooghe et al., 2007; 
D’Amboise and Muldowney, 1988; Tan et al., 2009). 
In response to these definitional and measurement issues, Torrès and Julien (2005) 
challenged the specificity paradigm with regard to the heterogeneity of SMEs, classifying 
them within a single expanded scheme that captured simultaneously many small firm 
attributes. This scheme focuses on the nature of SMEs rather than their size. Torrès (2003, 
2006) had earlier introduced the proximity concept to reinterpret the specificity paradigm. 
Together, these works contribute two novel concepts: proximity and denaturation, which 
are used to describe both the nature and dynamism of small firms. Proximity refers to the 
nature of firms represented by “the small businesses concept”: small size, centralised 
management, low levels of labour specialisation, intuitive and short-term strategy, simple 
and informal information systems, and serving a local market. Denaturation describes 
SMEs that have “de-natured”; that is, they have moved beyond the nature of “the small 
business concept” and have come to resemble the larger firm, exhibiting characteristics 
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such as formalisation of systems and processes, diversification of the business, and 
internationalisation of markets (Torrès, 2003, 2006; Torrès and Julien, 2005). 
We ground our framework in Levie and Lichtensteins’ (2010) conceptualisation of firm 
development, as well as Torrès’ (2003, 2006) and Torrès and Julien's (2005) small firm 
heterogeneity models, in presenting four typical dynamic states experienced among 
SMEs. Successful transitions between these states are facilitated by redefining the board’s 
function as a portfolio comprising four primary board roles. Previous research has 
presented discrete board roles in conjunction with firm stages. Our framework indicates 
that strategic value is contributed by the board when various roles are played concurrently, 
but with particular emphasis on the role most relevant to the requirements for navigating 
through the transition and transformation to a given new state. The portfolio notion 
promotes the idea that a board selects the combination of control, service, strategy 
(Hillman et al., 2000; Huse and Zattoni, 2008; Zahra and Pearce, 1989) and mediation 
(Blair and Stout, 2001; Lan and Heracleous, 2010) roles that are consistent with the firm’s 
circumstances (Bonn and Pettigrew, 2009; van Ees et al., 2009). 
From a theoretical standpoint the framework we develop in this paper specifies more fully 
the dynamism and complexity associated with board roles in conjunction with SME 
developmental pathways than has previously been presented in this literature. Our 
framework is novel in that we elaborate both typical and counterintuitive transitions 
between states. In this way we contribute not only to board role and firm growth literature 
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but also to governance practice in SMEs since potentially our framework offers some 
guidance to firm leaders for successful navigation through these transitional crises and 
challenges. From a methodological standpoint, our conceptual framework has several 
implications for future research. We thus conclude the paper with suggestions for research 
based on these implications, to test empirically and further develop the theoretical 
framework. 
Review of Literature 
Board roles in SMEs: a portfolio approach 
Many theoretical perspectives have been applied to board roles in SMEs. The wider 
corporate governance literature identifies a variety of different roles that boards of 
directors may adopt in decision-making. Those of control, service and strategy have 
emerged as the principal board roles (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Foremost among the 
variety of theoretical perspectives are agency theory, resource dependency theory and 
institutional theory (Gopinath et al., 1994; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). Stakeholder theory and team production theory have indicated a fourth 
board role of mediation among multiple stakeholder coalitions with divergent and/or 
competing interests (Blair and Stout, 2001; Lan and Heracleaous, 2010; van Ees et al., 
2009). 
The control role of the board. The board’s control role is consistent with the conformance 
(also referred to as accountability or compliance) dimension of corporate governance 
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(Hilmer and Tricker, 1994; Short et al., 1999). Derived from agency theory, this role is 
organised around the generic concept of the board’s monitoring function (Huse, 2007). As 
the main role, it emphasises hiring and firing executives, as well as financial control and 
monitoring performance (Adams et al., 2010). The board’s control activities include 
controlling the firm’s financial performance, monitoring the firm’s strategies, appraising 
the CEO’s behaviour and the executive team’s performance, as well as defining executive 
remuneration policy, and nominating and/or dismissing executives and/or directors. 
The board’s service role. The service role draws primarily upon resource dependency 
theory, considering the board to be at the frontier of the organisation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). In the service role the board makes three main contributions: (1) legitimisation 
(Hung, 1998; Huse and Zattoni, 2008), (2) external linkage and resource provision 
(Hillman et al., 2000) and (3) information gathering, advice and counsel (Davis et al., 
1997; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). The service role may contribute toward decision 
quality and therefore affect long-term firm performance. 
The board's strategic role. According to Zahra and Pearce (1989), this role includes 
encouraging discussion and constructive debate, evaluation and, potentially, initiation of 
strategic proposals. In the strategic role, directors are able to make a strategic contribution 
to the firm from their professional expertise and experience, in the formulation, refinement 
and evaluation of strategies. In addition to helping articulate the firm's mission and setting 
the guidelines for implementation and control of strategy, boards acting in a strategic role 
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will also make a key contribution at critical points when major decisions are made 
regarding, for example, mergers and acquisitions, divestment, re-structuring, or 
diversifications (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
The mediation role of boards. More recently, greater attention has been paid to the 
relationship between firms and their stakeholders, which has favoured the emergence of 
the fourth governance role of mediation (Blair and Stout, 2001). Legal perspectives on 
corporate governance (Coffee, 1988; Lan and Heracleous, 2010) and team production 
theory (Blair and Stout, 2001; Kostant, 1999) help explain why corporate boards should 
adopt a mediation role and function as independent arbiters among corporate constituents 
with a vested interest in the entity. Boards are designed also to play an intervening or 
mediating role between the enterprise and society and to help resolve and balance 
competing claims on the corporation (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Demb and Neubauer, 
1992). 
The portfolio approach to board roles. The four board roles (control, service, strategy and 
mediation) represent aspects of the board’s overall governance function. While a specific 
orientation or emphasis is indicated with each of the four roles, respectively, the 
boundaries between each are less distinct in practice. Rather than seeing the board’s roles 
in an organisation as the sum of the four single roles, we argue for a portfolio approach as 
proposed by Demb and Neubauer (1992) and adopted by Jonsson (2013). Each individual 
board selects a set of tasks most appropriate to the firm’s needs, from among those 
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involving monitoring and control, guidance and support, strategy formulation and 
implementation, and arbitration and mediation. The portfolio approach is consistent with 
a strategic contingency view of the board’s role where involvement in directing the 
business will vary over time (Bonn and Pettigrew, 2009; Johnson, 1997; Lynall et al., 
2003), as well as across the company’s evolution (Aguilera et al., 2008; Astrachan et al., 
2002; Charkham, 1994). According to Zahra and Pearce (1989: 298) “… boards are 
expected to perform qualitatively different roles at various points in the [firm’s] life 
cycle”. Board role adaptation is thus relative to changing firm circumstances (Jonsson, 
2005; Lynall et al., 2003), which are reflected in the growing demands on the board (Huse, 
2007) and the nature of modern businesses. 
We suggest, thus, that as a strategic decision making group (Forbes and Milliken, 1999), 
boards of directors may need to adapt to both changing circumstances in their firms’ 
environments (Levie and Lichtenstein, 2010) and their internal complexity (Markarian 
and Parbonetti, 2007). Boards may also adopt a pro-active role in the transition process, 
leading and even initiating strategic change for the firm (Bonn and Pettigrew, 2009; 
Filatotchev et al., 2006; Johnson, 1997). 
 
Life cycles: from growth stages to dynamic states 
While stages theory and organisational life cycle (OLC) models have dominated firm 
growth debates for more than five decades (Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Greiner, 1972, 
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1998; Kazanjian, 1988, 1990), current thinking has moved away from the idea of a fixed 
linear sequence of growth stages to a more multi-dimensional concept of firm states 
(Delmar et al., 2003; Levie and Lichtenstein, 2010). 
Growth stages. A plethora of stages models exist in the OLC literature (Greiner, 1972, 
1998; Scott and Bruce, 1987; Kazanjian, 1990) but there is little consistency either in the 
number of elements that define these models or their constitutive components. In their 
2007 review of this literature Phelps et al. identified 33 distinct models that provide a set 
of common premises and underpinning assumptions about organisations, but which lack 
integration. While in the early years of its development the OLC literature was largely 
conceptual and descriptive, models have gained increasing sophistication in their 
conceptualisation of growth (Brown and Mawson, 2013; Phelps et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, stages models have been criticised for being linear, unidirectional, 
sequenced and deterministic (Andersen, 2008; Empson, 2010; Levie and Lichtenstein, 
2010). Most describe only internal issues of growth. Criticisms include a lack of 
specificity regarding the “life stage” concept (Aldrich, 1999; Hanks et al., 1993), and a 
dearth of empirical foundations for many of the studies (Drazin and Kazanjian, 1993; 
Levie and Hay, 1998; Miller and Friesen, 1983). 
Studies (Bailey and Grochau, 1993; Rutherford et al., 2003) have found that stages do not 
appear to be correlated with the chronological age of the firm. In order to avoid 
deterministic, linear associations, Aldrich (1999) substituted the term firm “life course” 
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for “life cycle”. Lack of clarity and consensus also exists regarding the number of stages 
in the firm’s life cycle and what exactly determines a stage or phase, as well as its typical 
duration. In addition there is a lack of convergence around a common model. 
In response to criticisms of stages models, current thinking has thus moved away from the 
idea of a fixed linear sequence of growth stages to a more multidimensional concept of 
dynamic states, where crises or issues can occur at different points and may recur 
throughout the firm’s growth trajectory (Brown and Mawson, 2013). As firms increase in 
size and complexity and managers face various sets of dominant problems that will change 
over time and in relation to different stages in a firm’s growth, both directors and 
executives need more sophisticated capabilities and greater flexibility to adapt their role 
(Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001; Kazanjian, 1988; Phelps et al., 2007). 
Stages of growth models have been found to be poor predictors of the particular problems 
businesses face at given stages (Phelps et al., 2007). A further criticism of stages models 
is that they imply an inexorable positive progression to a point of “arrival” through a 
“latent mechanism that governs the formation, growth, transformation, and maturity 
stages” (Stubbart and Smalley, 1999: 279). There is little empirical evidence to support 
this contention. In this regard it would appear that the biological analogy for stages models 
is unhelpful and possibly misleading (Phelps et al., 2007). Conceptualisations have been 
developed based on clusters or sets of problems not linked by sequential stages 
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(Kazanjian, 1988; Phelps et al., 2007), but instead as states of firm growth (Levie and Hay, 
1998). 
Dynamic states. Increasing criticism of the OLC approach and its inability to address the 
growth paths has culminated in a “terminal assessment” of stages theories by Levie and 
Lichtenstein (2010). In their assessment of more than 100 growth models, Levie and 
Lichtenstein (2010) challenged two major propositions: first, that businesses, like 
organisms, develop through a specific number of stages and, second, that stages represent 
an inherent programme of development. Levie and Lichtenstein (2010) suggest moving 
forward by building on complexity theory concepts, thus considering the firm as a 
complex adaptive system, and its evolution as a navigation through dynamic states 
reflecting the continual tension between stability and change that characterises 
entrepreneurship. The dynamic states approach thus provides a more compelling model 
which considers the nonlinear dynamics of businesses’ development and growth, 
“increasing their fitness within their changed environment” (Levie and Lichtenstein, 2010: 
331). A dynamic state is defined as a “network of beliefs, relationships, systems and 
structures that convert opportunity tension into tangible value for an organisation’s 
customers/clients, generating new resources that maintain the dynamic state” (Levie and 
Lichtenstein, 2010: 336). 
In the dynamic states framework firm growth is not a predictable sequence of stages 
characterised by increasing size and age, nor is it a foreseeable sequence of problems to 
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be resolved. Rather, it is more complex, discontinuous and unique to each firm although 
recognisable challenges are encountered at critical inflection points during growth as a 
result of internal or external stimuli (Brown and Mawson, 2013; Levie and Lichtenstein, 
2010). 
Based on a process theory of emergence which explains how entirely new states come into 
existence – for example, through new ventures – the dynamic states approach assumes 
that over its lifetime a firm will likely experience a series of configurations. This approach 
aims to reflect an optimal relationship between a firm’s business model and its 
environment. Instead of focusing on the number of specific life cycle stages, this argument 
concentrates on questions of when a given dynamic state and associated business model 
is viable in certain knowable environmental conditions, and how various transitions 
between dynamic states are related to those conditions (Levie and Lichtenstein, 2010). 
However, small firm heterogeneity has hampered capturing these dynamic states in a 
single model. Furthermore, this approach does not capture the forces that underpin a 
transition from one state to another, as firms change their growth trajectory (Brown and 
Mawson, 2013). 
 
SME heterogeneity 
Two analytical concepts of proximity (Torrès, 2003, 2006) and denaturation (Torrès and 
Julien, 2005) more adequately model the large heterogeneity in SMEs. The concept of 
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proximity defines SMEs in terms of the traditional classical model – that is, small size, 
powerful/central owner manager, simple organisational structure, informal information 
systems, ad hoc strategy and close geographical markets. Conversely, the concept of 
denaturation represents forces that may propel SMEs toward what Torrès and Julien 
(2005) termed the “anti-small business” concept, an idea similar to that of the 
“professional small business” (Flamholtz and Randle, 2007; Dekker et al., 2015). 
The concept of proximity. The SME literature identifies, explicitly or implicitly, different 
forms of proximity that characterise SMEs according to key features or specificities 
(Torrès and Julien, 2005). For this paper, we posit that shareholding, ecological and 
hierarchical proximity as well as organisational maturity are central to governance and 
organisational problems in SMEs. These four attributes help to qualify the relationships 
between ownership and control, as well as between the firm and its primary stakeholders. 
Shareholding proximity is where a firm’s shares are concentrated among a few internal 
and/or external shareholder owners. Because of their ownership proximity, shareholders 
may be informed directly by the managers and are often sufficiently knowledgeable about 
the firm's business. In family firms (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Ward, 2001), as well as 
entrepreneurial and venture-backed businesses (Garg, 2013; Rosenstein, 1988; Sapienza 
et al., 1996), strong personal relationships are shown to increase the flow of information, 
reduce information asymmetry, and enable greater control by shareholders over strategic 
decisions. 
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Ecological proximity builds on the spatial proximity described by Torrès (2003), 
extending it beyond its geographical dimension. The idea of ecology emphasises the 
nature of the firm’s relationships rather than physical distance. This concept describes 
SMEs that are embedded in a close and relatively narrow operating environment which 
includes local markets, banking and financing institutions, business associations, political 
and administrative bodies, and communities, from which the firm obtains its key 
resources. Strong links often characterise relationships between the SME owner-manager 
and key actors in the firm’s competitive and institutional environment. Demands from key 
stakeholders are communicated directly to the firm through close stakeholder relationships 
and integrated into the decision making process, filtered through the CEO’s perceptions. 
Based on the firm’s dependencies on stakeholders the management process is informal 
and fundamentally relational (Torrès, 2003). 
The concept of hierarchical proximity (Torrès, 2003) refers to the centralisation of 
management style and structure and denotes the focal role of the founder/manager. 
Various studies in the SME literature have identified the strengths and weaknesses of this 
type of proximity regarding its impact on firm performance (Castaldi and Wortman, 1984; 
Daily and Dalton, 1993; Osborn, 1991). Nevertheless, the CEO’s contribution to the 
SME’s processes and performance is considered central (Castaldi and Wortman, 1984; 
Osborn, 1991; Torrès, 2003). Whether the executive is the owner or a professional 
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manager he or she is, most often, the key link between internal and external organisational 
stakeholders. 
Organisational maturity (derived from Torrès (2003, 2006)) expresses the notion of 
maturity rather than chronological age, and relates to the firm’s levels of formalisation and 
operational capability (Belt et al., 2009). This concept describes a relatively immature 
SME characterised by centralised power and control and low levels of labour and task 
specialisation; employees are recruited on a personal basis; the firm has simple 
management and information systems and favours implicit, intuitive, short term strategies. 
Conversely, a relatively mature SME is highly decentralised, with a formalised 
organisational structure and formal management systems, a complex information system 
and elaborated strategy processes (Dekker et al., 2015; Torrès and Julien, 2005). 
The concept of denaturation. Denaturation is a concept introduced by Torrès and Julien 
(2005) to account for the heterogeneity observed among SMEs. The denaturing context is 
where one or more of the characteristics associated with small-sized firms are radically 
different, theoretically, from those usually associated with small firms situated in their 
“natural” or classical SME context. Except for their smallness, denatured firms may 
resemble large firms in their management methods, differing from the small business 
model in their ownership, leadership and organisational characteristics. 
Examples of denaturing contexts that contrast with the classical model include small 
businesses operating in global markets (born global firms) which require decentralised, 
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formalised strategic, reporting and coordinating systems, and task diversity. High 
technology firms also exemplify denatured SMEs since their capital needs typically 
require external funding, whether from venture capital or public investors, thus exhibiting 
altered shareholding proximity. Mature family SMEs whose ownership is in the hands of 
later generations may exhibit denaturation when they rely on professional managers 
(Dekker et al., 2015; Ward, 2001). Thus, denaturing of ownership proximity refers to the 
alteration of ownership concentration through opening up the firm to venture capital (VC), 
private equity, or public investment. The denaturation of ecological proximity refers to a 
firm's operational environment which extends beyond the local context characteristically 
associated with the classical small business. Increased dissociation between ownership 
and management and the use of salaried professional managers as senior executives relates 
to the denaturation of hierarchical proximity. 
The process of denaturation can be bi-directional in that some firms may experience re-
naturation of one or more of their characteristics (shareholding, hierarchical, ecological 
and/or organisational). This reversal process may occur through management buyouts or 
“going private”, the return of the founder or owner to head the firm, or strategic refocusing 
and/or restructuring. 
The two analytical concepts of proximity and denaturation provide useful means for 
elaborating on Levie and Lichtenstein’s (2010) dynamic states approach. We argue that 
the four forms of proximity are especially relevant to SME governance. 
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A new conceptual model of boards in transitioning firms 
Dynamic states and key dimensions of firm evolution 
From the firm growth and organisational studies literature and building on the proximity-
denaturation framework, we select four states in which an SME may typically exist during 
its life course: new venture/start-up, high growth, plateaued growth, and professional 
management. These states are depicted along four axes (see Figure 1) as transitional but 
non-directional and non-sequential positions. A firm may move in any direction between 
states over the course of its life and stabilise within a given state for a relatively short or 
long period of time. 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
New venture/start-up. The initial state is typical of start-ups and new ventures where the 
entrepreneur plays a central role in both the firm’s ownership and management. 
Characteristically firms in this state show a high level of proximity on all dimensions 
except the maturity dimension. Within these settings, SMEs resemble the classical small 
firms to which Torrès and Julien (2005) refer as “naturated”. Simple organisational 
structure, informal communication, a sense of “family” and co-operation among the 
organisation's members, as well as high member commitment to the firm (Miller et al., 
2008) and personalised leadership (Flamholtz and Randle, 2007), are typically 
characteristic of firms navigating this state. 
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High growth. In this state high growth occurs mainly through access to external resources, 
although growth triggers may be exogenously, endogenously or co-determined (Brown 
and Mawson, 2013). While organisations in this state may be relatively immature, 
ownership may become more dispersed, and the firm less dependent on close relationships 
with the immediate ecological environment. The entrepreneur continues to play a key role 
within the firm, especially in strategic decision-making, even when professional managers 
are appointed. Successful technological and born global firms are typical examples of this 
state. Entrepreneurs in firms entering this state are generally highly motivated to pursue a 
growth strategy requiring the involvement of external financiers through debt and/or 
equity funding. While such firms exhibit limited formalisation of their management, they 
continue to be entrepreneurially-oriented with a clear focus on developing their market 
penetration through extending product lines, as well as diversifying their customer base 
and/or their geographical markets. 
Plateaued growth. Firms in this state may exhibit limited growth aspirations or potential. 
The typical fully-established SME operating in a mature and competitive environment, as 
well as owner-managed mature firms, are such examples, which may range from high to 
moderate shareholding, hierarchical and ecological proximity. Where proximity is high, 
owners continue to play a central role in the firm’s management. Firms in this state also 
continue to operate in a narrow ecologically proximate environment and maintain strong 
personal relationships with key stakeholders (customers, suppliers, bankers and 
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community representatives). Plateaued firms with more dispersed shareholding show 
distinctive features of organisational maturity with the coexistence of both newly 
introduced formal systems and persisting informal processes. To maintain their financial 
independence, owners and/or family managers pay considerable attention to stability and 
financial performance as key success indicators. 
Professional management. SMEs in this fourth state, while remaining limited in size, take 
full advantage of their increased organisational maturity as well as increased separation of 
ownership and control. In these firms, professionalisation includes formalised governance 
and managerial functions, as well as internal information, financial control and reporting 
systems (Dekker et al., 2013, 2015; Flamholtz and Randle, 2007). Firms in this state 
operate in a more expansive environment requiring a continual trade-off between 
organisational constituents and their possibly conflicting demands. 
All transitions will involve a re-definition of both the firm’s dominant logic and the 
business model supporting its operations (Levie and Lichtenstein, 2010). Such transitions 
may be triggered by challenges from the external environment such as market maturity or 
increasing competition in the firm’s core business from factors in the internal environment 
such as new product or service innovations, or the exit of the founder, or a combination of 
such factors. Resolution of these challenges and crises and successful transition to a new 
state may involve, for example, product or market diversification, the formation of 
alliances, spin-offs, new subsidiaries and divisions, or changes in ownership through 
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takeover, merger or acquisition, management buy-out (MBO) or buy-in (MBI). Radical 
re-configuring of the business model and re-structuring, downsizing, turnaround and 
changes in top management may also be required (Brown and Mawson, 2013). Not only 
will dynamic capabilities and adaptive capacity be essential managerial requirements, an 
effective board will also require the necessary competences to guide the firm successfully 
through these transitions. Table 1 presents the four states and their specific characteristics 
as well as the main challenges associated with reaching each state. 
Insert Table 1 Here 
Much of the SME governance literature has been dedicated to high growth and 
technological start-ups confronted with transitioning from an entrepreneurial/founder 
manager to a professional management state (Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Zahra and 
Filatotchev, 2004; Zahra and Hayton, 2005). However, high growth firms represent only 
a small proportion of new ventures, many of which never achieve spectacular growth. 
Most SMEs have modest growth aspirations and remain small (Fraser et al., 2015; Levie 
and Lichtenstein, 2010; McKelvie and Wiklund, 2010). Nevertheless, they will 
undoubtedly be confronted with governance challenges and transitions associated with 
dynamic change during their existence (Brown and Mawson, 2013). 
The conceptual model 
We extend the thinking on SME governance in a comprehensive model (Figure 2) which 
incorporates this new conceptualisation of the dimensions of ownership and management 
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as well as the operating environment and organisational maturity. 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
Transitioning from new venture to high growth. The small new venture is typically 
characterised by high proximity, highly concentrated ownership (comprising family and 
affiliates) and a simple management structure. Its internal systems will be largely informal 
and accountability will be mainly to internal stakeholders. The entrepreneur’s willingness 
to grow (Mckelvie and Wiklund, 2010) and market and competitive conditions (Brown 
and Mawson, 2013) may favour a high growth strategy that requires access to external 
resources. The main focus of SMEs transitioning from new venture to high growth is on 
gaining a sustainable strategic position. To achieve the entrepreneur’s aspirations, the firm 
needs to develop its organisational knowledge and skills (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004) 
but it also needs access to important external resources (Daily and Dalton, 1993; Lynall 
et al., 2003) such as financial capital and technologies to extend its product lines, as well 
as diversify its customer base and develop its market position (Churchill and Lewis, 1983; 
Flamholtz and Randle, 2007; Greiner, 1972). Such expansion adds complexity, making 
the management task both more demanding and more important (Bonn and Pettigrew, 
2009). In this transition the SME needs to assure increased operational reliability 
(Flamholtz and Randle, 2007). Greater emphasis is placed on financial planning and cash 
management to sustain growth (Flamholtz and Randle, 2007). 
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While firms entering this state exhibit limited formalisation of their management they 
continue to be entrepreneurially-oriented with a clear focus on developing their market 
penetration. During this transition, raising external finance through equity (business 
angels, venture capital or other business partnerships) or debt (banking, customers or 
vendor funding) is likely. This may involve the appointment of outside directors to the 
board. A major board focus will be on assisting with addressing strategic and financial 
issues (Sapienza et al., 1996) and overseeing strategic decision-making (Garg, 2013; 
Rosenstein, 1988; Sapienza et al., 1996). 
Boards involved in transitioning from a new venture to high growth will play a key part 
in determining the firm’s response to greater external complexity. The board’s strategy 
role will be emphasised in this transition where directors can contribute to decision-
making and provide key expertise to complement management skills (Daily and Dalton, 
1993; Garg and Eisenhardt, 2013; Sapienza et al., 1996). 
After a period of high growth, firms may face a downturn in market conditions with 
intensification of competitive forces, or severe pressure on the firm’s resource-base to 
address a growing market (Brown and Mawson, 2013; Garnsey et al., 2006). Garnsey et 
al. (2006: 7) consider that new ventures “lacking [financial] reserves” may experience 
“dangerous consequences” of rapid growth. Whether following a bankruptcy filing or a 
voluntary retrenchment strategy, firms in these situations will experience a reverse 
transition and will need to return to a start-up state of re-creation if they are to survive. 
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The major challenge will be to reposition the firm in a viable market niche and redefine 
its business model through product/service restructuring as well as resource 
reconfiguration.  
For successful transitioning through these circumstances, inputs from board members in 
strategic decision-making may include redefining the business scope and selecting the 
products and services as well as the market niches to address. Conceivably, the board will 
need to critically review and possibly reformulate the firm’s mission statement. Where 
firms have experienced a major failure, the board may need to complement its strategy 
role with a substantial investment in its service role. In these firms, a breakdown of trust 
among major stakeholders may require a major effort by the board to re-legitimise the 
firm and guarantee their commitment and contribution to the re-creation process. 
An example of this transition is Tadpole Tech (Garnsey and Hefferman, 2005). Six years 
after start-up in the mid-1980s, Tadpole Tech transitioned to high growth based on a niche 
market providing specialist computer boards to computer companies and production of 
the SPARC notebook. After listing on the UK stock exchange in 1992, an attempt to enter 
a broader market with a new product, the P1000 notebook was unsuccessful. Over-
optimistic sales forecasts combined with an unfamiliar and unexpectedly difficult market 
to penetrate, as well as shipping delays on the SPARC product resulted in a dramatic 
decline in sales and profits. Faced with a cash crisis the company was forced after four 
years to return to a start-up state and a critical need to redefine its products and markets.  
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Transitioning from new venture to plateaued growth. As we have noted, entrepreneurial 
growth studies tend to focus on high growth firms and many new ventures achieve only 
limited growth (McKelvie and Wiklund, 2010). Not all entrepreneurs aspire to, or have 
the capability for, continued growth (Brown and Mawson, 2013; Fraser et al., 2015; 
Delmar and Wiklund, 2008). For example, when compared to owner-operated firms, 
family firms have been found more frequently to adopt conservative strategies, favouring 
business stability and guaranteeing employment and/or careers for family members 
(Miller et al., 2011). Conservative strategies may limit access to external resources and 
thus limit growth opportunities. Based on its internal resources, the SME may grow by 
focusing on limited market niches, building customer loyalty rather than acquiring new 
customers. The entrepreneur's priority is on strengthening financial independence and 
increasing the firm’s legitimacy in its local environment. In this state, the small business 
will be accountable to a limited number of external stakeholders including important 
customers (Miller et al., 2008) and possibly community leaders. Ownership continues to 
be concentrated among a few shareholders or family members, while the management 
team remains small and aligned with strong founder leadership and an informal, 
personalised management style. 
During this transition, the founder's power is strong and the board's contribution is 
primarily through its service role in assisting the entrepreneur by advising, counselling, 
mentoring and acting as a sounding board (Ward, 2001). The board in this role will support 
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decision making by legitimising both the founder and the firm within the external 
environment. Whilst the firm’s focus is on developing by relying on its internal resources, 
directors will also emphasise their service role, helping the firm build linkages and key 
relationships with important stakeholders such as suppliers, customers and the local 
community. 
SMEs transitioning between the new venture and plateaued growth states are typically 
found in mature and competitive traditional industries. The plateaued growth state may be 
relatively stable and firms may remain in this state for extended periods of time. For some 
family firms this state can extend for a generation or more.  
Company M (Lou and Caspersz, 2010) is an example of this transition from new venture 
to plateaued growth. Founded in Australia in 1967 as a local sub-divisional land contractor 
with five employees, the company experienced a predictable but limited period of growth 
lasting for more than two decades after having grown to become a well-established firm 
in the construction industry. 
After years of relative stability and moderate growth, firms may experience renewed high 
growth triggered, for example, by an injection of venture capital, or they may face 
deterioration in their competitive and/or financial situation due to intensifying competition 
or weakening economic conditions. Restructuring the firm necessitates market 
repositioning and redefining other key elements of its business model. This rebirth process 
requires a breadth of entrepreneurial skills from the strategic leaders to identify new 
27 
 
opportunities and secure resources and capabilities most applicable to the new business 
model. In this situation, the board will focus on both its strategic and service roles. 
Mechanics Corp, a French precision mechanics company founded in 1974, transitioned in 
both directions through this state. The company originally specialised in manufacturing 
mechanical parts for the local textile industry, growing from a new venture to a turnover 
of around €1.2 million and 10 employees. The owner/manager, his wife and two friends 
(who owned a textile/clothing business) comprised the board which advised on overall 
business direction and protecting the firm’s reputation. In the early 1990s following a 
regional economic downturn in the textile industry, the firm’s turnover reduced by more 
than half. From stable plateaued growth the SME faced returning to a new venture state 
for survival. With the addition of two new board members who brought network linkages 
to a new emerging cluster in the packaging industry and a specific contact list for this new 
market, the strategic repositioning returned the company to growth with an increased 
turnover of €1.5 million and 12 employees. 
Transitioning from high growth to professional management. In transitioning from a high 
growth state the firm enters a process of further denaturing (of hierarchical proximity). 
While shareholding is more dispersed, the relatively entrepreneurial firm (as described by 
Flamholtz and Randle (2007)) adopts increasingly formalised organisational structures, 
systems and processes (Dekker et al., 2013). There is greater role differentiation within 
the firm’s structure and a more diffused power base (Dekker et al., 2015; Zahra and 
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Hayton, 2005). Procedures become more standardised and the firm is more concerned with 
maintaining its strategic position (Levie and Lichtenstein, 2010). 
With greater scale and complexity in the business there is also wider scope for 
management to pursue their own interests at the expense of shareholders and other 
stakeholders (Certo et al., 2001; Daily and Dalton, 1993). Therefore agency problems may 
arise requiring closer board monitoring and control of managerial actions and decisions 
(Daily and Dalton, 1993; Fama and Jensen, 1983). To navigate successfully to a state of 
professional management, the board of directors is likely to expand with the appointment 
of independent directors. In this context increased environmental and organisational 
complexity require board responsibility for overall performance as well as accountability 
for asset protection (Hilmer and Tricker, 1994). Thus, during this transition the board will 
add value to the firm by exhibiting effective monitoring and control (Filatotchev et al., 
2006) to mitigate managerial opportunism and reduce agency costs, thereby protecting the 
interests of outside shareholders and the company’s assets (Daily and Dalton, 1993). 
While firms undergoing the initial public offering (IPO) process may illustrate this 
transition, a management buy-out (MBO) or buy-in (MBI) strategy may also feature. 
Private equity firms and other forms of external investment may also characterise SMEs 
during the transition to greater professionalisation. 
An example of this transition is Company M (Lou and Caspersz, 2010), which, after the 
lengthy period of plateaued growth referred to above, extended to the second generation 
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in 1984 with the founder’s son joining the business as part of a family succession plan. As 
managing director the son brought new vision and growth aspirations to the business, with 
diversification stimulated by the acquisition of another firm in 2000. The acquisition and 
expansion of the business led to rapid growth between 2004 and 2008 and a decision to 
formalise the company’s management and governance structure. Instigated by the son, 
this decision was based on the owning family’s shared vision about future direction and 
the need to convey to stakeholders an image of the firm as a “professional” business. To 
manage the growth Company M moved to a divisional structure with three divisions. A 
formal board was established in 2009 with two independent directors and one family 
member: the son, as board chair. Annual revenue grew during this four-year period by 24 
percent to around $AUD40 million, with staff numbers reaching up to 200 employees 
depending on the number of contracts. It was the family’s shared vision and agreement on 
a succession plan that facilitated board establishment and consequently enabled the 
transfer of management control from one generation to the next. 
Firms in this state may experience a reverse transition if market pressure toward 
innovation and growth is strong. As its primary focus, the board in this situation will 
emphasise the strategy and control roles. In the strategy role the board’s key tasks involve 
searching for, identifying and selecting suitable growth prospects, and ensuring 
appropriate acquisition and allocation of resources for the new initiatives. New board 
members with specific skills and expertise to advise management on the chosen growth 
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strategy is signalled for this transition. The board’s key control tasks for this transition 
include ensuring adequate risk management and monitoring progress towards meeting 
growth expectations. 
In such situations, perceived new opportunities for high growth may necessitate 
challenging the formalisation process and existing organisational culture. Re-allocation of 
resources into R&D and marketing during this transition will likely shift priorities away 
from the development of managerial skills and systems. Consequently, an entrepreneurial 
management style will characterise the emergent firm during this reverse transition, with 
the board’s main contribution being the selection of the most favourable market 
opportunities to pursue. Strategic control will be essential, with emphasis on the strategy 
and control roles in the board’s role portfolio. 
Founded in 1865, UK retailer Timpson diversified from its origins as a shoe manufacturer 
and repairer and focused on implementing professional management systems and 
processes when the company listed on the UK Stock Exchange in 1929. After delisting 
from the stock exchange in 1963 and returning to family ownership in 1983 through an 
MBO, Timpson experienced new growth, expanding into retail areas such as key cutting, 
engraving, offset printing and film processing. As its primary focus, the board under this 
scenario will emphasise the strategy and control roles. The board’s key strategy tasks 
involve searching for, identifying and selecting suitable growth prospects, and ensuring 
appropriate acquisition and allocation of resources for the chosen new initiative. Of the 
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options Timpson decided to expand into key cutting and engraving, requiring new 
members on the board with specific skills and expertise such as knowledge of potential 
markets and optimal retail locations, to advise management on the chosen strategy. 
Transitioning from plateaued growth to professional management. SMEs may be mature 
established firms yet relatively simple in their organisational structures and systems. By 
evolving in a stable environment, these firms are characterised by moderate ownership, 
hierarchical and ecological proximity. Confronted with external change in the market 
and/or competitive landscape, or internal change accompanying an IPO, founder 
retirement or generational transition (Brown and Mawson, 2013), these owner-managed 
firms will need to become professionally managed (Flamholtz and Randle, 2007; Ward, 
2001). In this transition the professionalisation of management may change the firm’s 
relationships with stakeholders and require a greater focus on the claims or influence of a 
few key stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). Under these circumstances, a mediation role 
will be emphasised. 
Owner control and entrenchment during a plateaued state may impede firm performance 
and growth and hinder transition to the professionalised management needed by the firm 
to continue to adapt to a newly dynamic environment. Schulze et al. (2001) highlighted 
various sources of dispute in privately held family firms that can also further entrench 
owner-managers, including conflicts between self- and other-member interests which may 
become contentious among family constituents. In this situation, boards will emphasise a 
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mediating role to withstand the entrenchment of decision-making and control held by an 
owner and/or founder-manager aiming to enlarge their discretionary power (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989). The board may also play an active role in resolving conflicts between 
family members and mediating among multiple family branches during the succession 
process (Bammens et al., 2008). 
Third generation and mixed family firms, combined family/non-family-managed firms, 
co-operatives, and larger mature professional partnerships are examples of firms 
experiencing this transition where clan and inter-group interests are likely to become 
significantly divergent. As such, they resemble Torrès and Julien’s (2005) denatured firm. 
As with the transition from new venture to plateaued growth, professionally managed 
firms may transition and settle into a period of plateaued growth. In this plateaued state 
there may be an extended period of moderate or low growth. Catalysts for this transition 
may involve exogenous stimuli such as an acquisition, or endogenously triggered shifts 
such as de-listing from a stock exchange, or entering an MBO or MBI. A de-listed firm 
may return to concentrated family or founder ownership or may transfer ownership to a 
private new owner. 
Transitioning from high growth to plateaued growth. A period of plateaued growth may 
follow for firms after experiencing high growth. This state may involve consolidation at a 
new level after radical re-configuration of the business model. The board will best support 
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the firm through this transition by balancing all four roles in its role portfolio, emphasising 
a service role upon stabilising in a plateaued state. 
As an example, HealthLan specialises in IT solutions for hospitals. After 10 years of high 
growth building on customised solutions the company wanted to accelerate its growth. 
This required the board’s help in merging with an industry market leader. Eighteen months 
later, efforts to align the two firms’ incompatible organisational cultures caused the merger 
to falter. The board decided that HealthLan should demerge and refocus on its core 
markets. The company spun out of the merger, re-focusing its business on mid-sized 
hospitals, expecting this strategy to achieve a stable but lower level of (plateaued) growth 
for HealthLan. To facilitate this transition the board appointed two new directors with 
information technology (IT) skills and market knowledge of medical practice to guide the 
development of new customised IT solutions. 
The reverse transition along this trajectory describes a rejuvenating firm on entering a 
renewed high growth state after a (possibly temporary) period of low or no growth or 
slight decline. This may occur through stimulating the firm’s entrepreneurial orientation 
through a change in the executive team or in board composition (Gabrielsson, 2007). 
Established family firms with a long tradition of low to moderate growth based on internal 
resources may open up to external resources such as capital funding or more dispersed 
shareholding, thus changing their business model and their development pathway. 
Generational succession in a family firm where a new generation of owners is highly 
34 
 
motivated toward growth (Delmar and Wiklund, 2008) may favour this kind of transition. 
Company M exemplified this transition following the entry of the founder’s son into the 
business in 1984, as referred to above. Companies facing financial distress and filing for 
legal protection in relation to bankruptcy may also experience this transition with 
successful turnaround of the business. As with the forward transition in this state, its 
reverse is aligned with a balanced portfolio of board roles, but the strategy role will be 
emphasised to drive and guide new growth opportunities. 
Transitioning from new venture to professional management. A start-up/new venture may 
transition early to professional management which may be VC- initiated. High technology 
firms are the most likely to make this transition. The board will initially balance all four 
roles in the early phase of the transition but the control role will be emphasised as the firm 
stabilises in its professional management state. 
Terapixel in Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson’s (2013) study made this transition. Founded in 
1990, Terapixel had a global vision from the outset. Its first delivery of photo-masks was 
to Brazil in 1991 and by the third year after start-up international sales accounted for 50 
percent of the total. By 2000 the firm had diversified its global markets and its product 
portfolio, achieving sales growth totalling €1 million, with staff numbers expanding to 12 
employees. Sales peaked at this level and the number of staff began to decline with 
cessation of opportunity identification after investors introduced new management. The 
company experienced equipment maintenance problems, difficulties in gaining large 
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global deals, and the loss of major customer accounts. Terapixel was forced to retrench to 
nearby countries and filed for bankruptcy in 2004. 
The reverse trajectory is also possible, where a firm may shift from a professionally 
managed state to a new venture state through a spin-off. Professional practice firms may 
follow this trajectory where some of the partners may establish a new start-up practice 
affiliated with the original firm. Jagersma and van Gorp (2003) describe successful 
managed spin-out strategies by a Dutch professional service firm. In this case the firm 
clusters spin-outs into a separate enterprise unit to avoid the new enterprises cannibalising 
the established business. The professional firm provides a non-executive board chair to 
guide the new enterprise until it is established. During enterprise development the firm 
makes official decisions for the spin-out while fostering spontaneous creativity in the new 
enterprise unit. At the threshold of this transition the board will balance all four roles, 
emphasising the strategy role while establishing the new enterprise, which may 
subsequently be taken back into the parent firm, as in the Dutch case. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have developed a dynamic, multi-theoretic and multi-dimensional 
framework that contributes to theory by integrating literature streams on SME growth with 
a board role portfolio approach in the corporate governance literature. First, we bring a 
new perspective to SME growth by developing for the first time, to the best of our 
knowledge, operational dimensions for Levie and Lichtenstein’s (2010) dynamic states 
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approach. Second, we contribute to board governance theory by conceptualising SME 
board functioning as a portfolio of roles enacted simultaneously by the board but 
emphasising the primary role most appropriate for the firm’s transitional needs. 
Our model captures greater complexity and nuance in theories of SME growth and 
development by depicting multiple transitional trajectories associated with various 
possible evolutionary dynamic states, including reverse and counterintuitive transitions. 
While the framework describes six possible bi-transitional trajectories between four 
typical states, it is logically capable of modelling other trajectories along similar 
horizontal/vertical dimensions in either/any direction. Accordingly, it overcomes 
criticisms of other models since it is inherently non-linear, non-unidirectional, non-
sequential and non-deterministic. Moreover, the framework allows for SME heterogeneity 
along dimensions of proximity and denaturation, thereby establishing a more 
comprehensive, dynamic conceptualisation of both SME development and governance 
than has previously been presented in the literature. 
Our model does not attempt to predict the length and duration of each state. Rather, it 
suggests critical trigger points (Brown and Mawson, 2013) that signal the emphasis on a 
specific board role required to help the firm navigate successfully through a transitional 
phase to a new state. Transitions are decisive periods in the life of companies, bringing 
significant challenges for boards and management and may cause severe stress at every 
level of the organisation (Flamholtz and Randle, 2007). Failure to address these challenges 
37 
 
may eventually result in the total collapse of the firm (Filatotchev et al., 2006; Greiner, 
1972, 1998). 
The model has a number of implications for theory and practice and offers a large research 
agenda. The model indicates more clearly the primary board roles that are most suited to 
helping the firm resolve the particular challenges associated with dynamic change, various 
states, the types of transition between them, the nature of the firms and the key dimensions 
along which they vary in our model but these represent only a few of many possible 
transitional permutations that could be examined. Other states, firm dimensions and 
accompanying transitional challenges, as well as the appropriate board role emphases, 
could also be represented in this type of model. The constructs and dimensions we have 
selected for our framework represent an initial step in modelling firm dynamism and 
further empirical work is required to test and confirm these elements. 
Our framework potentially provides owners, other key stakeholders and boards of 
directors of small and growing firms with practical guidance as to the most effective type 
of governance and applicable board role for a given growth state or transitional path. Such 
guidance will be enhanced by empirical research that strengthens and validates the 
framework. A methodological strategy could include case study research to further 
elaborate and extend the characteristics of each of the states in our model, as well as the 
relevant director skill sets and board competencies required for the associated board roles 
for each transition. Case studies would also allow greater in-depth examination of firms 
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experiencing the consequences of trigger events. To substantiate the framework a set of 
propositions could then be tested using quantitative methods such as structural equation 
modelling and longitudinal analysis of a wide cross-section of firms’ evolutionary 
pathways. 
  
39 
 
References  
Adams RB, Hermalin BE and Weisbach MS (2010) The role of boards of directors in 
corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey. Journal of economic 
literature 48(1): 58–107. 
Aguilera RV, Filatotchev I, Gospel H and Jackson G (2008) An organizational approach 
to comparative corporate governance: Costs, contingencies, and complementarities. 
Organization Science 19(3): 475–492. 
Aldrich H (1999) Organizations evolving. London: Sage Publications. 
Andersen JA (2008) An organization called Harry. Journal of Organizational Change 
Management 21(2): 174–187. 
Astrachan JH, Klein SB, and Smyrnios KX (2002) The F-PEC scale of family influence: 
A proposal for solving the family definition problem. Family Business Review 15(1): 45–
58. 
Bailey D and Grochau KE (1993) Aligning leadership needs to the organizational stage of 
development: Applying management theory to non-profit organizations. Administration 
in Social Work 17(1): 23–45. 
Bammens Y, Voordeckers W and Van Gils A (2008) Boards of directors in family firms: 
A generational perspective. Small Business Economics 31(2): 163–180. 
40 
 
Becker A, Knyphausen–Aufseß DZ and Brem A (2015) Beyond traditional developmental 
models: A fresh perspective on entrepreneurial new venture creation. International 
Journal of Entrepreneurial Venturing 7(2): 152–172. 
Belt P, Olva-Kess A, Harkonen J, Mottonen M and Kess P (2009) Organisational maturity 
and functional performance. International Journal of Management and Enterprise 
Development 6(2): 147–164. 
Blair M and Stout LA (2001) Director accountability and the mediating role of the 
corporate board. Washington University Law Quarterly 79(2): 403–449. 
Bonn I and Pettigrew A (2009) Towards a dynamic theory of boards: An organizational 
life cycle approach. Journal of Management and Organization 15(1): 2–16. 
Bouckenooghe D, De Clercq D, Willem A and Buelens M (2007) An assessment of 
validity in entrepreneurship research. Journal of Entrepreneurship 16(2): 147–171. 
Boxer R, Perren L and Berry A (2016) SME managing director and non-executive director 
trust relations: The dynamic interplay between structure and agency. International Small 
Business Journal 34(3): 369–386. 
Brown R and Mawson S (2013) Trigger point and high-growth firms. Journal of Small 
Business and Enterprise Development 20(2): 279–295. 
Castaldi R and Wortman Jr MS (1984) Boards of directors in small corporations: An 
untapped resource. American Journal of Small Business 9(2): 1–10. 
41 
 
Certo ST, Daily MC and Dalton RD (2001) Signalling firm value through board structure: 
An investigation of initial public offerings. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 26(2): 
33–50. 
Charkham J (1994) Keeping good company: A study of corporate governance in five 
countries. Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press. 
Churchill NC and Lewis VL (1983) The five stages of small business growth. Harvard 
Business Review (61): 30–39. 
Coffee JC (1988) Shareholders versus managers: The strain in the corporate web. In: 
Coffee JC, Lowenstein L and Rose-Ackerman S (eds) Knights, raiders, and targets: The 
impact of the hostile takeover. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Corbetta G and Salvato CA (2004) The board of directors in family firms: One size fits 
all? Family Business Review 17(2): 119–134. 
D’amboise G and Muldowney M (1988) Management theory for small business: Attempts 
and requirements. Academy of Management Review 13(2): 226–240. 
Daily CM and Dalton DR (1993) Boards of directors, leadership and structure: Control 
and performance implications. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 17(3): 65–81. 
Davis J, Schoorman FD and Donaldson L (1997) Toward a stewardship theory of 
management. Academy of Management Review 22(1): 20–47. 
42 
 
Dekker J, Lybart N, Steijvers T, Depaire B and Merken R (2013) Family firm types based 
on the professionalization construct: Exploratory research. Family Business Review 26(1): 
81–99. 
Dekker J, Lybaert N, Steijvers T and Depaire B (2015) The effect of family business 
professionalization as a multidimensional construct on firm performance. Journal of Small 
Business Management 53(2): 516–538. 
Delmar F and Wiklund J (2008) The effect of small business managers' growth motivation 
on firm growth: A longitudinal study. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice (32): 437–
457. 
Delmar F, Davidsson P and Gartner WB (2003) Arriving at the high-growth firm. Journal 
of Business Venturing 18(2): 189–216. 
Demb A and Neubauer FF (1992) The corporate board. London: Oxford University Press. 
Drazin R and Kazanjian RK (1993) Applying the Del technique to the analysis of cross-
classification data: A test of CEO succession and top management team development. 
Academy of Management Journal 36(6): 1374–1399. 
Empson L (2010) Beyond dichotomies: A multi-stage model of governance in professional 
service firms. Working Paper CPSF-004. City University London: Cass Centre for 
Professional Service Firms. 
43 
 
Fama EF and Jensen MC (1983) Agency problems and residual claims. Journal of Law 
and Economics 26(2): 325–344. 
Filatotchev I, Thoms S and Wright M (2006) The firm’s strategic dynamics and corporate 
governance life-cycle. International Journal of Managerial Finance 2(4): 256–279. 
Flamholtz EG and Randle Y (2007) Growing pains: Transitioning from an 
entrepreneurship in a professionally managed firm. 4th edition. San Francisco: The 
Jossey-Bass Business and Management Series. John Wiley and Sons. 
Forbes DP and Milliken FJ (1999) Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding 
boards of directors as strategic decision making groups. Academy of Management Review 
24(3): 489–505. 
Fraser S, Bhaumik SK and Wright M (2015) What do we know about entrepreneurial 
finance and its relationship with growth? International Small Business Journal 33(1): 70–
88. 
Gabrielsson J (2007) Boards of directors and entrepreneurial posture in medium-size 
companies putting the board demography approach to a test. International Small Business 
Journal 25(5): 511–537. 
Gabrielsson P and Gabrielsson M (2013) A dynamic model of growth phases and survival 
in international business-to-business new ventures: The moderating effect of decision-
making logic. Industrial Marketing Management 42(8): 1357–1373. 
44 
 
Garg S (2013) Venture boards: distinctive monitoring and implications for firm 
performance. Academy of Management Review 38(1): 90–108. 
Garg S and Eisenhardt KM (2013) Unpacking the CEO-board relationship: CEOs 
perspective on board-level strategic decision making. Working Paper. Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University of Science and Technology. 
Garnsey EW and Heffernan P (2005) Growth setbacks in new firms. Futures 37: 675-697. 
Garnsey E, Stam E and Heffernan P (2006) New firm growth: Exploring processes and 
paths. Industry and Innovation 13(1): 1–20. 
Gedajlovic E, Lubatkin MH and Schulze WS (2004). Crossing the threshold from founder 
management to professional management: A governance perspective. Journal of 
Management Studies 41(5): 899–912. 
Gnan L, Montemerlo D and Huse M (2015) Governance systems in family SMEs: The 
substitution effects between family councils and corporate governance mechanisms. 
Journal of Small Business Management 53(2): 355–381. 
Gopinath C, Siciliano JI and Murray RL (1994) Changing role of the board of directors: 
In search of a new strategic identity. The Mid-Atlantic Journal of Business 30(June): 175–
85. 
Greiner LE (1972) Evolution and revolution as organizations grow. Harvard Business 
Review 50(4): 37–46. 
45 
 
Greiner LE (1998) Evolution and revolution as organizations grow. Harvard Business 
Review 76(3): 55–68. 
Hanks SH, Watson CJ, Jansen E and Chandler GN (1993) Tightening the life-cycle 
construct: A taxonomic study of growth stage configurations in high-technology 
organizations. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 18(2): 5–29. 
Hillman AJ, Canella AA and Paetzold RL (2000) The resource dependency role of 
corporate directors: Strategic adaptation of board composition in response to 
environmental change. Journal of Management Studies 37(2): 235–256. 
Hilmer FG and Tricker RI (1994) An effective board. In: Tricker RI (ed) International 
corporate governance: Text, readings and cases. Singapore: Prentice Hall. 
Hung H (1998) A typology of the theories of the roles of governing boards. Corporate 
governance 6(2): 101–111. 
Huse M (2000) Boards of directors in SMEs: A review and research agenda. 
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 12(4): 271–290. 
Huse M (2007) Boards, governance and value creation: The human side of corporate 
governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Huse M and Zattoni A (2008) Trust, firm life cycle, and actual board behavior: Evidence 
from "one of the lads" in the boards of three small firms. International Studies of 
Management and Organization 38(3): 71–97. 
46 
 
Jawahar IM and McLaughlin GL (2001) Toward a descriptive stakeholder theory: An 
organizational life cycle approach. Academy of Management Review 26(3): 397–414. 
Jagersma PK and van Gorp DM (2003) Spin-out management: Theory and practice. 
Business Horizons 46(2): 15–24. 
Johnson RB (1997) The board of directors over time: Composition and the organizational 
life cycle. International Journal of Management 14(3): 339–344. 
Jonsson EI (2005) The role model of the board: A preliminary study of the roles of 
Icelandic boards. Corporate Governance: an International Review 13(5): 710–717. 
Jonsson EI (2013) One role is not big enough: A multi-theoretical study of board roles in 
SMEs. International Journal Business Governance and Ethics 8(1): 50–68. 
Kazanjian RK (1988) Relation of dominant problems to stages of growth in technology-
based new ventures. Academy of Management Journal 31(2): 257–279. 
Kazanjian RK (1990) A stage-contingent model of design and growth for technology 
based new ventures. Journal of Business Venturing 5(3): 137–150. 
Kostant PC (1999) Exit, voice and loyalty in the course of corporate governance and 
counsel’s changing role. Journal of Socio-Economics 28: 203–246. 
Lan LL and Heracleous L (2010) Rethinking agency theory: The view from law. Academy 
of Management Review 35(2): 294–314. 
47 
 
Levie J and Hay M (1998) Progress or just proliferation? A historical review of stages 
models of early corporate growth. Working Paper FEM wp 98.5. London: Foundation for 
Entrepreneurial Management, London Business School. 
Levie J and Lichtenstein BB (2010) A terminal assessment of stages theory: Introducing 
a dynamic states approach to entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 
34(2): 317–350. 
Lou J and Caspersz D (2010) The applicability of theory perspectives to understanding 
governance in small to medium size family firms. International Journal of Management 
Case Studies 13(1): 56–67. 
Lynall MD, Golden BR and Hillman AJ (2003) Board composition from adolescence to 
maturity: A multi-theoretic view. Academy of Management Review 28(3): 416–431. 
Markarian G and Parbonetti A (2007) Firm complexity and board of director composition. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 15(6): 1224–1243. 
McKelvie A and Wiklund J (2010) Advancing firm growth research: A focus on growth 
mode instead of growth rate. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 34(2): 261–288. 
McNulty T and Pettigrew A (1999) Strategists on the board. Organization Studies 20(1): 
40–74. 
Miller D and Friesen PH (1983) Successful and unsuccessful phases of the corporate life 
cycle. Organization Studies 4(4): 339–356. 
48 
 
Miller D, Le-Breton Miller I and Lester RH (2011) Family and lone founder ownership 
and strategic behaviour: Social context, identity and institutional logics. Journal of 
Management Studies 48(1): 1–25. 
Miller D, Le-Breton Miller I and Scholnick B (2008) Stewardship vs. stagnation: An 
empirical examination of small family and non-family businesses. Journal of 
Management Studies 45(1): 51–78. 
Mitchell RK, Agle BR and Wood DJ (1997) Towards a theory of stakeholder 
identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and how really counts. Academy 
of Management Review 22(4): 853–886. 
Muth MM and Donaldson L (1998) Stewardship theory and board structure: A 
contingency approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review 6(1): 5–29. 
Osborne RL (1991) The dark side of the entrepreneur. Long Range Planning 24(3): 26–
31. 
Perrault E and McHugh P (2015) Toward a life cycle theory of board evolution: 
Considering firm legitimacy. Journal of Management & Organization 21(5): 627–649.  
Pfeffer J and Salancik GR (1978) The external control of organizations: a resource-
dependence perspective. Harper and Row, New York. 
49 
 
Phelps R, Adams RJ and Bessant J (2007) Life cycles of growing organizations: A review 
with implications for knowledge and learning. International Journal of Management 
Reviews 9(1): 1–30. 
Quinn RE and Cameron KS (1983) Organizational life cycles and shifting criteria of 
effectiveness: Some preliminary evidence. Management Science 29(1): 33–51. 
Rosenstein J (1988) The board and strategy: Venture capital and high technology. Journal 
of Business Venturing 3(2): 159–171. 
Rutherford MW, Buller PF and Mcmullen PR (2003) Human resource management 
problem solver: The life-cycle of small to medium-sized firms. Human Resource 
Management 42(4): 321–335. 
Sapienza HJ, Manigart S and Vermier W (1996) Venture capitalist governance and value 
added in four countries. Journal of Business Venturing 11(6): 439–469. 
Schulze W, Lubatkin M, Dino R and Buchholtz A (2001) Agency relationships in family 
firms: Theory and evidence. Organization Science 12(2): 99–116. 
Scott M and Bruce R (1987) Five stages of growth in small business. Long Range Planning 
20(3): 45–52. 
Shleifer A and Vishny RW (1989) Management entrenchment: The case of manager-
specific investments. Journal of Financial Economics 25(1): 123–139. 
50 
 
Short H, Keasey K, Wright M and Hull A (1999) Corporate governance: From 
accountability to enterprise. Accounting and Business Research 29(4): 337–352. 
Stubbart CI and Smalley RD (1999) The deceptive allure of stage models of strategic 
processes. Journal of Management Inquiry 8(3): 273–286. 
Tan J, Fischer E, Mitchell R and Phan P (2009) At the center of the action: Innovation and 
technology strategy research in the small business setting. Journal of Small Business 
Management 47(3): 233–262. 
Torrès O (2003) Petitesse des entreprises et grossissement des effets de proximité, Revue 
Française de Gestion 144: 119–138. 
Torrès O (2006) The proximity law of small business finance. 51st International Council 
for Small Business Annual Conference, Melbourne, Australia. 
Torrès O and Julien PA (2005) Specificity and denaturing of small business. International 
Small Business Journal 23(4): 355–377. 
van Ees H, Gabrielsson J and Huse M (2009) Toward a behavioural theory of boards and 
governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review 17(3): 307–319. 
Ward JL (2001) Creating effective boards for private enterprises: Meeting the challenge 
of continuity and competition. Marietta: Family Enterprise Publishers. 
51 
 
Wilson N, Wright M and Altanlar A (2014) The survival of newly-incorporated companies 
and founding director characteristics. International Small Business Journal 32(7): 733–
758. 
Zahra SA and Filatotchev I (2004) Governance of the entrepreneurial threshold firm: A 
knowledge based perspective. Journal of Management Studies 41(5): 885–897. 
Zahra SA and Hayton JC (2005) Organizational life cycle transitions and their 
consequences for the governance of entrepreneurial firms: An analysis of start-up and 
adolescent high technology new ventures. In: Filatotchev I and Wright M (eds) Corporate 
governance life-cycle. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp.32–56. 
Zahra SA and Pearce JA (1989) Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: 
A review and integrative model. Journal of Management 15(2): 291–334. 
  
52 
 
Figure 1. Four main states 
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Table 1. Four dynamic states and their characteristics 
 State I 
New venture (NV) 
State II 
(High) growth (HG) 
(external resources) 
State III 
Plateaued growth (PG)  
(internal resources) 
State IV 
Professional 
Management (PM) 
Ownership 
Proximity 
High Moderate High Low 
Ownership 
characteristics 
Individual/Few 
owners/Concentrated 
ownership structure 
Extended to dispersed 
private equity/Public  
Few/Family/ 
Concentrated 
Many/Dispersed 
Ecological 
Proximity 
High Moderate Moderate Low 
Operating 
environment 
characteristics 
Narrow/Tight/  
Limited 
Extending/ 
Diversifying 
Extending and/or 
diversifying 
Wide 
Hierarchical 
Proximity 
High High Moderate Low 
Management 
characteristics 
Entrepreneurial/ 
Intuitive and 
centralised decision 
making 
Entrepreneur(s) 
continue to play a key 
role/Growing 
management teams 
with few professional 
managers 
Small teams/Strong 
founder(s) leadership 
Extended Professional 
Management 
teams/Decentralized 
decision making 
Organization 
maturity  
Low Low Moderate High 
Organization 
characteristics 
Low formalisation / 
informal information 
exchange. 
Entrepreneurial 
strategy making  
Low formalisation / 
informal information 
exchange. 
Entrepreneurial 
strategy making  
Coexistence of 
formalised information 
systems and informal 
control and evaluation 
processes. 
 
Formalised management 
systems/ formalised 
control and information 
systems. 
Main goal Survival Growth/Resources 
acquisition 
Stabilization/profit Optimization/Profit 
Key challenges 
 
 
- Identifying market 
opportunity 
- Developing products 
and services 
- Acquiring customers 
legitimacy 
- Acquiring Financial 
resources 
- Extending products 
lines  
- Developing market 
penetration/position 
- Diversifying 
customers  
- Assuring operational 
reliability 
- Focusing on market 
niches  
- Building local/ 
regional legitimacy 
- Building customers 
loyalty 
- Consolidating market 
positions and 
customers loyalty 
- Arbitrating 
internal/external 
growth 
- Diversifying businesses 
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- Raising external 
capital/finance  
- Strengthening 
financial 
independence  
 
- Strengthening financial 
performance 
 
Examples of 
firms 
Inception/Emergence 
and early development  
Innovative and high 
tech start-ups/Born 
global firms 
(Traditional) SMEs 
operating in mature 
and competitive 
industries/ Owner(s) 
managed firms 
IPOs/second-third 
generation family 
business 
Larger/established 
mature firms 
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Figure 2. Conceptual framework 
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